APPEAL NO. 041093 FILED JUNE 16, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 6, 2004. The hearing officer determined that the appellant's (claimant) compensable injury of ______, does not include an injury to the lumbar spine. In his appeal, the claimant essentially argues that the hearing officer's extent-of-injury determination is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. In its response, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

Initially, we note that the claimant attached a May 6, 2004, letter from Dr. B to his appeal, which was not admitted in evidence at the hearing. Documents submitted for the first time on appeal are generally not considered unless they constitute newly See generally Texas Workers' Compensation Commission discovered evidence. Appeal No. 93111, decided March 29, 1993; Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). In determining whether new evidence submitted with an appeal requires remand for further consideration, the Appeals Panel considers whether the evidence came to the knowledge of the party after the hearing, whether it is cumulative of other evidence of record, whether it was not offered at the hearing due to a lack of diligence, and whether it is so material that it would probably result in a different decision. See Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93536, decided August 12, 1993. Upon our review, we cannot agree that the evidence meets the requirements of newly discovered evidence, in that the claimant did not show that the new evidence submitted for the first time on appeal could not have been obtained prior to the hearing or that its inclusion in the record would probably result in a different decision. The evidence, therefore, does not meet the standard for newly discovered evidence and will not be considered.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant's compensable injury of _______, does not include an injury to the lumbar spine. The claimant had the burden of proof on that issue and it presented a question of fact for the hearing officer. There was conflicting evidence presented on the disputed issue. The 1989 Act makes the hearing officer the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As such, the hearing officer was required to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine what facts the evidence established. In this instance, the hearing officer simply was not persuaded that the claimant sustained his burden of proving the causal connection between his compensable injury and a lumbar spine injury. The hearing officer was acting within his province as the fact finder in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the challenged determination is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence

as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Thus, no sound basis exists for us to disturb the hearing officer's extent-of-injury determination on appeal. <u>Cain v. Bain</u>, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **TEXAS PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION for Villanova Insurance**, an **impaired carrier** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

MARVIN KELLY 9120 BURNET ROAD AUSTIN, TEXAS 78758.

	Elaine M. Chaney Appeals Judge
CONCUR:	
Daniel R. Barry Appeals Judge	
Robert W. Potts Appeals Judge	